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Executive summary
Many health problems are potentially avoidable and governments have long 
had powerful tools at their disposal to infl uence population health and change 
individual behaviours, directed both ‘upstream’ at some of the underlying 
causes of poor health, as well as at ‘downstream’ challenges when poor 
health behaviours are already manifest. But how effective are these different 
actions? This policy summary briefl y maps out what is known about some of 
the different potential mechanisms that can be used to infl uence behaviour 
change to promote better health, including some innovative approaches that 
are arising from disciplines such as behavioural economics and psychology. 
There is a robust evidence base supporting the use of taxation to reduce 
consumption of harmful products such as alcohol and tobacco, but this 
approach has been used much less frequently to infl uence consumption of 
foods and sugary soft drinks, with mixed success. Legislation can also be a 
highly effective tool to infl uence health behaviours and it has often been most 
successful when preceded by other actions to raise awareness of the health 
impacts of a poor health behaviour, for example, not wearing a seatbelt. Other 
effective measures can include income-redistribution policies or measures to 
improve access to education and lifelong learning. Passive information and 
health-education campaigns may only have modest impacts on behaviour, but 
mass media campaigns can be targeted at whole populations at relatively low 
cost per head of the population, meaning that even modest levels of behaviour 
change may be cost effective. 
Combinations of several of these interventions can be even more effective and 
often highly cost effective, but they will not work for everyone. Individuals do 
not always respond and may be resistant to changing their behaviours, even 
in the face of signifi cant fi nancial costs. For instance, many in society will be 
resistant to any change in entrenched behaviours; they may be more infl uenced 
by peer pressure and addiction. Many people also have diffi culties in weighing 
up the gains in participating in an unhealthy activity today, such as smoking, 
with the increased risks to health in years to come. A poor appreciation of 
risk is one reason why some individuals are highly optimistic about their 
chances of avoiding any future harm to their health. There may also be social 
or environmental factors that make it hard to adopt healthier behaviours. 
Countering obesity may only require modest changes to physical activity and 
dietary habits, but these changes are still diffi cult for many people to adhere 
to, particularly for those living in an obesogenic environment with less-active 
jobs and easy access to high-energy-density foods and sugary drinks. These 
challenges have been used to argue for a greater focus on techniques developed 
using behavioural psychology and economics. Can our choices be infl uenced in 
subtle ways that ultimately help society achieve more of its health policy goals?
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Behavioural economics seeks to explain why individuals may make decisions that 
do not conform to rational economic theories related, for instance, to risk and 
price. Policy interventions informed by behavioural economics can be ‘softer’ 
than stricter forms of policy, but they should be perceived as tools to complement 
regulation, by moving society incrementally in a direction that might benefi t all, 
and only as a substitute for regulation when additional enforced measures are 
perceived by the public as an expression of government overstepping the mark. 
To date, however, the evidence base for actions that take their cue from 
behavioural economics and psychology is weak. Commitment contracts, 
with or without fi nancial incentives, have not had a long-term impact on health 
objectives such as weight loss. However, where the time frame for impact to be 
achieved is short, the chance of behaviour change is greater – for example, the 
benefi t of providing incentives to encourage smoking cessation to women during 
pregnancy. Changes to the environment, to make healthy lifestyle choices more 
convenient, may have more long-term success, but no long-term evidence is 
available. Other behavioural interventions, for instance, changing default decisions 
such as having to opt out rather than opt in to organ donation, or reframing 
information with visual and other cues to address issues of cognitive bias, are 
also promising, with effective applications observed outside the health sector. 
Behavioural economics is clearly not a universal panacea, but by using the insights 
from human psychology that are embedded in the approach, it appears possible 
to design interventions that – in some circumstances – are relatively well equipped 
to motivate people to behave in ways that are better for themselves, and for 
society at large. In the current fi nancial climate, many potential policy proposals 
may also have the added advantage of being very low cost. It is, though, important 
to understand what mechanisms are acceptable to the public; they may object 
to the principle of rewarding individuals simply for doing the right thing, or be 
uncomfortable with the idea of automatic organ donation, preferring instead 
to rely on family consent. It is therefore important to build evaluation in to any 
implementation process, particularly given that actions may have more impact on 
some population groups than others; issues of equity also need to be considered. 
Finally, it should be stressed that, while the science of behaviour change 
has been in development for some time, the actual application of theories 
and fi ndings to public health policy is still developing. The key tools remain 
measures such as taxation, legislation and provision of health information. The 
evidence base on what works to infl uence behaviour, and in what context, is 
still in development, with many unanswered questions on how best to design 
new innovative interventions that can complement, and in some instances 
augment, these well-established mechanisms. Despite there being plenty of 
policy ideas informed by behavioural economics fl oating around, more ideas 
are needed in a health context, and far more evidence is required on their likely 
effectiveness and cost effectiveness.
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Key messages
• Traditionally, public health policy has relied on a combination of tools, 
most frequently health-education and -information campaigns, taxation 
policies to infl uence decisions related to health behaviour, and legislation 
to prohibit unhealthy activities.
• While these approaches are effective and have led to many public health 
improvements, they are blunt instruments; individuals do not always 
respond to these tools and may even be resistant to changing their 
behaviours in the face of signifi cant fi nancial benefi ts. Rational persuasion 
can have relatively little impact on entrenched habits, particularly if they 
involve strong peer pressures or even addiction.
• In some cases, expansion in the use of strict approaches that limit choice, 
such as new legislation, can be unpopular with a public that may see some 
actions as an unnecessary encroachment into matters of personal choice.
• A better understanding of factors that infl uence behaviour change may 
help in designing public health strategies that reach segments of the 
population that have been impervious to existing public health strategies.
• There is a growing body of knowledge on mechanisms that directly 
seek to infl uence health behaviours, recognizing that individual choice 
and decision-making is infl uenced by many different factors. Many of 
these approaches have evolved out of research focused on behavioural 
economics and psychology.
• However, while a lot is known about long-standing public health actions, 
such as the role of taxation, legislation and health-information campaigns, 
the evidence base on what works to infl uence behaviour, and in what 
context, is still in development; there are many unanswered questions on 
how best to design new innovative interventions that can complement, 
and in some instances augment, well-established mechanisms. These 
mechanisms can also have both positive and negative unintended 
consequences.
• There is little evidence that behaviour-change interventions, for instance 
those using standard fi nancial incentives for change, or those that use 
techniques such as commitment contracts, with or without fi nancial 
incentives, have a long-term impact on objectives such as weight loss. 
Changes to the environment, to make healthy lifestyle choices more 
convenient, may have more long-term success, but again there is little 
long-term evidence available. The shorter the time frame for impact to 
be achieved, the greater the chance of behaviour change – for example, 
the benefi ts of smoking cessation during pregnancy. Other behavioural 
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interventions, for instance changing default decisions, such as having 
to opt out of organ donation, or reframing information with visual and 
other cues to address issues of cognitive bias, can also play a role, but 
information on their effectiveness is limited.
• Adopting a more positive approach to health-promotion messages, 
emphasizing the immediate enjoyment of a healthy lifestyle, is helpful.
• Examples of positive public–private-sector partnerships can be identifi ed, 
especially where a business case for healthy living can be identifi ed.
• Given the lack of robust evidence on mechanisms to infl uence change 
in health behaviour, it is important that, in planning implementation, 
an assessment of needs is undertaken and that planners are as specifi c 
as possible about the content, target group and provision of theories 
justifying the action.
• While some low-cost actions can be highlighted, it should be stressed that 
there is little robust information on the effectiveness, let alone the cost 
effectiveness, of innovative approaches to behaviour change. Therefore, 
careful evaluation, including analysis of costs, should be embedded into 
pilot phases of evaluation before scaling up interventions.
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1 Background
1.1 The economic impacts of avoidable health problems
Around half of all illness is linked to choices people make in their everyday 
lives – whether that is the choice to smoke, drink excessively, eat too much 
or exercise too little. These patterns of behaviour may be ‘deeply embedded 
in people’s social and material circumstances, and their cultural context’ 
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [NICE], 2007). The health 
and economic impacts of major health problems that are, in part, avoidable are 
well known and there is overwhelming evidence that changing people’s health-
related behaviour can have a major impact on some of the largest causes of 
mortality and morbidity and their costs to society (House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee, 2011).
For instance, obesity is an eminently avoidable but nonetheless growing 
problem in Europe. Addressing obesity is a key goal of much public health 
policy. The condition has been linked with an increased risk of a wide range 
of conditions, including cardiovascular disease and diabetes. Overall in high-
income countries, the total costs, including time lost from employment, of 
illness related to obesity, such as diabetes and cardiovascular diseases, have 
been estimated to be more than 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) (Sassi, 
2010). Costs to health-care systems can be substantial: between 1.5% and 
4.6% of total health-care expenditure in France (Emery et al., 2007), 4.6% 
in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) (Allender 
& Rayner, 2007) and 1.9% in Sweden (Odegaard et al., 2008). Cardiovascular 
diseases were estimated to cost more than €168 billion annually in the 
25 countries of the European Union in 2005 (EU-25), with more than 60% 
of the impact falling on health-care systems (Leal et al., 2006). Obesity is also 
associated with increased risk of cancer. Around 6.5% of all health-care costs 
in Europe are focused on cancer, which in 2002 was estimated to have an 
impact on the EU-25 countries of €54 billion (Stark, 2006).
Public health policies have also long focused on smoking. It is the greatest cause 
of premature death in Europe, where it claims over one and a quarter million 
lives prematurely every year. It has been estimated that, each year, tobacco 
costs the world economy some US$ (United States dollars) 500 billion in lost 
productivity, health-care costs, deforestation, pesticide/fertiliser contamination, 
fi re damage, cleaning costs and discarded litter; smoking has been estimated 
to reduce individual national income by as much as 3.6% (Shafey et al., 2009); 
and smoking-related conditions were estimated to cost the UK National Health 
Service (NHS) £5.2 billion in 2005, equal to 5.5% of UK health-care costs 
(Allender et al., 2009). Individual smokers and their families pay heavily in terms 
of direct costs, reduced income from smoking diseases and loss of income for 
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other urgent family needs. The private mortality costs of smoking in terms of 
value of life, were estimated to be US$ 222 for each packet of cigarettes for 
men and US$ 94 for women (Viscusi & Hersch, 2008). The overall annual costs 
of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, much of which is linked to smoking, 
have also been estimated in Europe to be €38.7 billion (European Respiratory 
Society and European Lung Foundation, 2003).
Much public health policy has also focused on the avoidance of the harmful use 
of alcohol. Alcohol is associated with more than 60 different health problems 
(Rehm et al., 2010). Even taking account of alcohol’s preventive effects, it has 
been estimated to cause 115 000 deaths each year in the EU alone, at a cost 
of €125 billion. This includes substantial costs due to lost employment, violence 
and crime (Anderson & Baumberg, 2006). It is also a major cause of health 
inequalities: 25% of the differences in middle-aged life expectancy between 
eastern and western Europe may be due to alcohol (Zatonski, 2008).
Another area of concern, avoidable injuries due to poor behaviour, as for 
instance in the road environment, is also associated with substantial economic 
costs. In 2004, the estimated annual costs, both direct and indirect, of traffi c 
injury in the EU-15 countries exceeded €180 billion, with some countries 
incurring costs of up to 3% of GDP. Traffi c injuries are the leading cause of 
hospitalization and death for people who are younger than 50 years in the EU, 
costing €180 billion annually (Racioppi et al., 2004). In the Russian Federation, 
the annual cost of road injuries is estimated to be US$ 34.3 billion, with a cost 
per fatality of more than US$ 1.1 million (Marquez et al., 2009).
1.2 Public health policy and behaviour change
Mindful of these and many other major social and economic impacts of poor 
health, policy-makers are continually looking for cost-effective ways in which to 
protect and improve population health. This concern for health is shared by the 
public at large. It is rare that a day goes by without media attention being given 
to the latest health scare or the latest way in which we can promote our health.
There is an increasing evidence base on the effectiveness of interventions to 
protect health and prevent disease, but a key challenge remains increasing 
the uptake of healthy lifestyles and behaviours; governments want to know 
how they can best use public funds and harness the power and goodwill of 
other stakeholders to help facilitate individuals to make different choices. 
Yet, changing behaviours can be diffi cult; few individuals are unaware of the 
harms associated with smoking or drinking, but they gain pleasure from these 
activities and there may be social or environmental factors that make it hard 
to adopt healthier behaviours. Countering obesity may only require modest 
changes to physical activity and dietary habits, but these are still diffi cult 
for many people to adhere to, particularly when they live in an obesogenic 
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environment with less-active jobs and easy access to high-energy-density foods 
and sugary drinks.
Governments have many different policy levers that are potentially of use in 
helping to infl uence health behaviours. They may positively infl uence health 
behaviours and/or reduce engagement in unhealthy behaviours or activities. 
Measures range from so-called ‘upstream’ actions, often outside of health-care 
systems, that focus on the underlying social determinants of health, such as 
poor education, poverty, inequalities and social deprivation, to downstream 
measures that address public health issues that have already begun to arise. 
All have their place within any health-promotion strategy.
Governments may target actions at the population as a whole or at specifi c 
population subgroups, such as individuals, households and communities, with 
the aim of reducing health inequalities and promoting health for all. These 
actions may be delivered in many different sectors, with a wide range of costs 
and benefi ts. For instance, there is a growing interest in early intervention for 
children and new parents, in order to promote positive mental and physical 
well-being and reduce the chances of long-term socioeconomic and health 
impacts. These actions will not be confi ned to health systems; many are 
likely to be funded and implemented across different tiers and sectors of 
government, such as the education sector. Delivery is also not confi ned to 
the state. Actions to promote health can be delivered by a range of non-state 
actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, as well as faith groups and 
the private sector.
2 Focus of the policy summary
This policy summary briefl y maps out what is known about different potential 
mechanisms to infl uence behaviour change to promote better health. It 
draws on information from existing systematic reviews of relevant interventions 
and approaches, as well as a targeted review for recent innovation in the 
fi eld. It looks at factors that infl uence behaviour change and places them 
in the context of an overall framework for the promotion of health, which 
distinguishes between interventions based on their target audience, mode 
of action, advantages and disadvantages, and ability to induce longer-term 
behaviour change. Almost no health-promotion efforts can be achieved using 
just one of the mechanisms alone; the policy summary also highlights how 
combinations of different mechanisms can be used to achieve different public 
health goals and looks at what is known about their cost effectiveness.
In particular, the review focuses in more depth on some more innovative 
approaches that are arising from disciplines such as behavioural economics 
and psychology. This should not be inferred to mean that these approaches 
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are more appropriate or cost effective than others, but rather that they have 
received less attention in the development of public health policy. Approaches 
such as the use of differing types of fi nancial incentives, and different ways of 
framing and communicating messages or altering the environment in which 
we all live, may be complements, or in some cases substitutes, to elements of 
public health strategies. The review draws on examples of practice from across 
many areas of health promotion, including issues of physical activity, diet, 
smoking, alcohol consumption, mental well-being and injury prevention. These 
behaviours have an important role for the burden of noncommunicable disease 
and injury, but the list of examples and areas of focus presented should not be 
considered to be exhaustive.
3 What factors infl uence why people do or do not 
change their behaviour?
What factors infl uence why people do or do not change their behaviour? 
Behavioural economists and psychologists have sought to address this question.
It is clear that individuals do not always respond easily to traditional health-
information campaigns and may even be resistant to changing their behaviours 
in the face of signifi cant fi nancial benefi ts. Rational persuasion can have 
relatively little impact on entrenched habits, particularly if they involve strong 
peer pressures or even addiction. A better understanding of factors that 
infl uence behaviour change may help in designing public health strategies that 
reach segments of the population that have been impervious to initiatives such 
as health-promotion information campaigns, or tools such as taxation.
In particular, it is currently in vogue to look at how behavioural economic 
fi ndings can inform understanding and infl uence policy design. The award 
of the Nobel Prize for Economics to Daniel Kahneman signifi cantly raised the 
profi le of behavioural economics, and Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book, 
Nudge, has been much admired in some policy circles (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). For instance in the UK, the current coalition government established 
a Behavioural Insights Team in the Cabinet Offi ce, with Thaler serving as 
an offi cial adviser. This unit sought to look at what people actually do in 
practice rather than what they should do in theory. Meanwhile, Sunstein has 
served as US President Obama’s regulation ‘Tsar’. The essence of the nudge 
approach is that behavioural economic insights can be used to change the 
‘choice architecture’ (i.e. the environment), so that people are more likely to 
make voluntary decisions that, on refl ection, they would like to make, and 
yet ordinarily fail to do so.
Owing to its potential to guide people towards making ‘better’ decisions, 
behavioural economics has been perceived in some policy circles as being 
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a potential alternative to stricter forms of regulation, such as taxes and bans. 
It is, however, a misconception to believe that behavioural economists oppose 
stricter forms of regulation – few, if any behavioural economists would 
argue that voluntary behavioural interventions and nudges should replace, 
for example, compulsory seatbelt legislation, drink–drive laws, food-safety 
legislation and taxation on certain harmful products.
Policy interventions informed by behavioural economics can be ‘softer’ than 
stricter forms of policy, but they should be perceived as tools to complement 
regulation, by moving society incrementally in a direction that might benefi t all 
of us, and only as a substitute for regulation when additional enforced measures 
are perceived by the public as an expression of a government overstepping the 
mark. In some circumstances, however, behavioural economics would arguably 
imply that harder forms of regulation are warranted. For instance, referring 
to a different sector and the fi nancial crisis, it has been suggested that any 
behavioural economist would contend that most individuals are not the best 
judges of the optimal amount that they ought to borrow and thus that there 
is a need for tight regulation of mortgage markets (Ariely, 2009).
3.1 What is behavioural economics?
So, what is behavioural economics? It arose out of critiques of neoclassical 
economics, which has dominated economic thought over the last century. 
Neoclassical economics assumes that people are the best judges of their own 
‘utility’ (or happiness), and that they will seek to maximize the happiness they 
gain from the choices that they make – that is to say, they are ‘optimizers’. 
Moreover, it is assumed that their preferences are fi xed and stable over time.
Since the 1950s, these principles have been questioned. From the 1960s, 
through work by Paul Slovic, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (among 
many others), it became apparent that people’s preferences are often not 
‘fi xed and stable’, but rather that they are regularly constructed in response 
to how choice contexts are ‘framed’, and are infl uenced by the manner in 
which preferences are elicited. The fi nding that preferences depend on, and 
are infl uenced in systematic ways by, how choice contexts are described, is 
central to the ‘nudge’ agenda.
Behavioural economics thus recognizes the limits of human rationality, with 
‘rationality’ being defi ned by the mainstream economic sense of the word, and 
comprises a number of observations on human decision-making that do not fi t 
well with neoclassical economic theory (Dolan et al., 2010). These include:
• the observation that losses loom substantially larger than gains – for 
instance, if one were to lose £20, the magnitude of the hurt felt would 
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be far greater than that of the pleasure of winning £20 – a phenomenon 
known as loss aversion;
• that reference points matter, such that people often care more about what 
they gain or lose around what they already have, rather than what they 
end up with;
• that people tend to overweight small probabilities – which is a partial 
explanation for why individuals buy lottery tickets, while at the same time 
purchasing appliance insurance that is usually expensive and poor value;
• that people allocate their money to discrete bundles, so that the value they 
attach to a particular amount of money will be contextual – for example, 
an individual might think £5 is a lot if he or she observes a £5 difference 
in the price of cinema tickets, but not if he or she observes a £5 difference 
between dealers in the price of a particular model of car;
• the observation of motivational crowding, such that offering money to 
people to do something may actually ‘crowd-out’ their intrinsic, altruistic 
motivation to do that very thing;
• ‘hyperbolic discounting’, which is the observation that people tend to 
place an enormous weight on the ‘immediate’ compared to the future, 
living for today at the expense of tomorrow (e.g. eating too much junk 
food, smoking) and overlooking the future consequences of their actions.
In addition to the above-stated observations, individuals often seemingly adopt 
a number of mental short cuts (rules of thumb or ‘heuristics’) when reaching 
their decisions, and apparently ‘satisfi ce’ rather than ‘optimize’, which goes 
against the grain of mainstream economics. These observations can include:
• the availability heuristic, in which people tend to assess the probability of 
an event by the ease with which similar instances can be brought to mind 
(e.g. many people erroneously think that the annual death rate from shark 
attacks is greater than that caused by falling coconuts);
• the anchoring heuristic, in which individuals often unconsciously focus 
upon, and can be manipulated by, entirely irrelevant cues when making 
decisions (e.g. the reason why salespeople use high initial prices in 
negotiations);
• the overconfi dence bias: for example, most people think their driving 
ability is better than average, which has obvious implications for road 
traffi c safety;
• the infl uence of context: for example, individuals giving up drinking 
may need tailored support to help them think through how to deal with 
diffi cult situations (e.g. social occasions, where they are used to drinking);
 Policy mechanisms to infl uence health behavior
7
• the infl uence of identity: if heavy drinking is linked to a macho culture 
as part of an individual’s social identity, he or she may need a powerful 
alternative identity to replace it if behaviour change is to be realized;
• the infl uence of networks: the old adage of ‘who you know shapes how 
you behave’ has been shown to apply in respect of obesity; at the same 
time, peer-support groups such as Weight Watcher clubs may help to 
facilitate behaviour change.
Behavioural economists have thus uncovered a library of systematic preference 
patterns and heuristics that cannot be explained by standard economic theory. 
Importantly, as will be emphasized throughout this policy summary, what works 
with one group will not always work with another. Segmentation and targeting 
are all important. Methods for changing behaviour need to be aligned with 
cultures, cognitive styles, social contexts, etc. In relation to alcohol, for example, 
some groups may be most infl uenced by messages about long-term harm, 
while others may be more infl uenced by self-image and the perceptions of 
others. Changing the environment in which people live and work is often the 
most powerful way of infl uencing their behaviour. For example, where the 
social norm is to smoke, it is harder to be a non-smoker. Banning smoking in 
workplaces and other public places has had an impact on changing this culture 
across all settings.
4 What mechanisms have been used to help infl uence 
health behaviours?
We now consider the different mechanisms that are available to policy-makers 
to help infl uence health behaviour. These can be considered in different ways, 
for instance in terms of their level of compulsion and intensity, ranging from 
the passive provision of information at one end of the continuum to strict 
enforcement of prohibition on activities, products and services at the other 
(see Figure 1).
It is important to recognize that a strategy to infl uence health behaviours 
may involve a number of different actions, as for instance illustrated in the 
framework of actions to encourage more physical activity in Figure 2. From this 
fi gure, it is clear that the focus of actions to date has been on issues related 
to the availability of services, provision of information, mandatory participation 
in school sports and provision of single-sex exercise classes. Much less attention 
has been placed on making use of behavioural economics and psychological 
tools that can infl uence internal and social factors that impact on behaviour 
(Prendergast et al., 2008).
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Figure 1: Mechanisms used to infl uence health behaviours
Figure 2: Example of a framework for action for behaviour change to promote 
physical activity 
Much used Less used
eg gym 
discounts, 
subsidizing 
community 
sports clubs, 
tax breaks, 
promoting 
‘free’ 
exercise 
opportunities
Making 
exercise 
cheaper to 
participate in
Not 
applicable:
making not 
exercising 
more 
expensive
Routine
exercise
habits
Raise
conscious
awareness
Framing 
of exercise 
messages
Addressing
issues of 
confidence 
and efficacy
Foster 
new 
pro-
exercise 
social 
norms
Utilise 
existing 
pro-
exercise 
norms
Consider
impact 
of biases, 
ie preference 
for short-term
gratification
Making 
exercise 
easier 
and more 
accessible
Making 
not 
exercising 
harder
eg improving
facilities 
and creating 
an accessible 
environment, 
public 
information 
campaign 
about simple 
government 
guidelines
eg make 
sport in 
schools 
mandatory 
and 
increase 
time spent
eg extracur-
ricular activities 
which bridge 
transition 
stages,
consciousness-
raising tools 
such as 
pedometers, 
school and 
workplace 
travel plans
eg 
reminders
such as 
‘use the 
stairs’
eg frame
messages 
around loss 
of good 
health, and 
promote 
positive 
gratification 
messages
eg frame
messages 
around loss 
of good 
health, and 
promote 
positive 
gratification 
messages
eg tailored 
and 
personalized 
advice, 
segmented 
(ie female 
only) classes, 
diversity 
of options
eg social 
marketing to 
place higher 
social value 
on being 
‘fit’ over 
sedentary 
lifestyles, 
seek to foster 
new inclusive 
non-
competitive 
sporting
culture
eg reinforce 
positive 
messages 
about social 
value of 
exercise 
and fitness, 
symbols 
to signify 
involvement
External Factors
EffortFinance
Increasing physical activity, factors affecting behavioural change
Habit Cognition Norms
Internal Factors Social Factors
shading indicates extent 
of current policy initiatives
Source: Prendergast et al., 2008.
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The most passive and least intensive of options is the simple distribution of 
information, perhaps through the mass media or through more targeted means, 
such as in primary care physician practices. Improving health literacy through 
health education is a more intensive approach that can help communicate 
issues such as how to interpret risk. This could be combined with provision of 
information on the health consequences of some actions, which can include 
visual prompts at the time that decisions are being made. This may, for instance, 
include voluntary industry agreements or legislative requirements on the 
provision of information on the calorie, fat, sugar and salt content of foods 
in restaurants. In March 2011, the UK Government announced that many 
restaurants and fast food outlets had agreed to include calorie counts on their 
menus, and some pubs would display alcohol units on beer mats and glasses.
Another approach is to make use of one-to-one or group-based learning and 
support. This may often be delivered by health-care professionals, as well as by 
peer groups. People often like to have an external pressure or commitment – 
challenging but sympathetic – to help them to do the things they want to do 
anyway. For other individuals, however, being part of a mutually reinforcing 
group may be the key to behaviour change – the peer-to-peer elements of 
Weight Watchers and Alcoholics Anonymous are clearly key components of 
those approaches. Mechanisms can also be used to help routinize health-
promoting behaviours, such as the use of pedometers for walking, or food 
diaries to monitor food consumption.
Many actions can help improve access to healthier choices, without preventing 
individuals engaging in unhealthy activities. This approach can again draw on 
what is known from psychology – that individuals will generally make do with 
the portion size on their plates; therefore, reducing the size of the portion 
(or indeed the plate) may help to reduce calorie intake. Other measures might 
involve reducing the size of chocolate bars, which does not limit the ability 
of a person to buy further bars if they so wish. In the same way, ‘all that you 
can eat’ buffet-style restaurants and happy hour bars are likely to encourage 
an individual to consume more calories than they would normally. Legislative/
regulatory change may be required to reduce access to these types of products, 
particularly if they have commercial benefi ts to business.
Measures to change the physical environment in which people live can 
also be used to infl uence their behaviour; examples are the provision of 
dedicated green spaces or cycle lanes to encourage cycling; installation of 
traffi c-calming measures in residential areas to change driver behaviour; and 
building regulations intended to reduce noise pollution between properties. 
Measures might also be taken to address automatic behaviour responses 
(Marteau, Hollands & Fletcher, 2012); for instance, the way in which products 
are displayed at the point of sale could be varied – for example, not having 
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cigarettes on view at checkout counters, or having healthy foods near these 
checkouts. In the same way, access to salads in self-service restaurants could be 
made easier, while less healthy foods might require a bit more effort to reach.
Financial measures have long been used as part of public health policies. Many 
have assumed that, in line with conventional economic theory, increasing/
decreasing costs associated with unhealthy/healthy activities will have an 
impact on demand and consumption patterns. Behavioural economic aspects 
have not been explicitly considered in their design. Traditionally, these measures 
have taken the form of specifi c taxes on the consumption of some goods such 
as cigarettes or alcohol. To a lesser extent, taxation has also been used to tax 
unhealthy foods such as fats or sugary drinks, although several European 
governments have introduced ‘fat taxes’, but not always successfully (as was 
the case in Denmark (Snowdon, 2013)). Subsidies for healthy products can also 
be used. These may be targeted at either the consumer or perhaps the supplier 
(this may also counter any incentives that the food industry receives to display 
certain products in prominent locations). In addition to taxation, other fi nancial 
incentives may be targeted at specifi c individuals, for instance through the 
provision of vouchers to reduce the costs of gym membership, or regulations 
around the pricing of products. These again assume that individuals operate 
as rational individuals in responding to price signals.
Actions informed by behavioural economics can also make use of material or 
fi nancial incentives to reinforce behaviour change, and examples can be seen 
in respect of smoking-cessation or weight-loss programmes. In psychology, 
approaches that get individuals to make a formal commitment to behaviour 
change have been shown to have impact. Such commitment contracts are 
sometimes combined with fi nancial incentives. Funds may be earned or losses 
averted, depending on progress in achieving health-promotion goals. Such 
measures can also be used to increase participation rates in health-promoting 
activities, such as going to the gym.
A wide range of examples of potential mechanisms drawing on behavioural 
economics and using fi nancial incentives have been cited in the work of the 
UK Government’s Behavioural Insights Team (Behavioural Insights Team, 2010). 
This team has, for example, piloted an intervention that appeals to loss aversion 
in relation to smoking cessation. The intervention offers the opportunity to 
those who wish to quit smoking to sign a voluntary contract where they lose 
rewards if they fail a regular urine- or blood-based smoking test. However, 
as indicated in Section 5.5, with rare exceptions, offering people rewards if 
they quit smoking has been shown to be ineffective in any sustained sense; 
it therefore remains to be seen whether ‘commitment contracts’ demonstrate 
more success, owing to the loss-aversion phenomenon.
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In addition to loss aversion, another approach infl uenced by behavioural 
economics is the use of ‘prompted choice’. In the UK as a whole, people have 
traditionally had to opt in to be an organ donor, which had led to a donor rate 
of roughly 20%. A system of presumed consent will, however, be introduced in 
Wales from December 2015. In several other countries, such as Austria, France, 
Portugal and Spain, people have to actively choose not to be a donor. That is to 
say, they are required to opt out. As a consequence, in those countries at least 
80% of the adult population are listed as potential donors.
The report of the Behavioural Insight Team (2010) also pays quite a lot of implicit 
attention to hyperbolic discounting, in that it offers a number of proposals 
that are intended to make activities that may be perceived as unpleasant 
(e.g. exercising, eating vegetables) more enjoyable to undertake. The team 
also proposes a range of initiatives that it claims are informed by behavioural 
economics, intended to increase rates of exercise, healthy eating and medical 
self-monitoring. For instance, fi nancial and non-fi nancial incentives, presumably 
modifi ed to have the greatest expected effect (e.g. through the use of deposit 
contracts as discussed earlier for smoking cessation, or by using lottery payment 
mechanisms, whereby people may ‘anchor’ on the amount to be won rather 
than the probability of winning, or by simply making the incentive ‘fun’), have 
been proposed.
Some of these measures draw on behavioural psychology; this approach can 
also be used in other ways, such as the positioning of fresh fruit near checkout 
counters in supermarkets or inducements to engage in physical activity, 
for example, the often-cited example of ‘piano stairs’, based on a one-day 
experiment in Stockholm where music was made as individuals walked up 
the stairs, increasing the use of the stairs (Volkswagen, 2009).
Visual prompts can also be used to encourage behaviour change. These 
prompts sometimes potentially serve to alter the reference point or anchor 
that people attach to ‘good’ behaviour (by increasing the salience of relevant 
information, resonating with the successful but simple ‘fi ve a day’ fruit and 
vegetable campaign). On average, this campaign lifted consumption of fruit 
and vegetables by 0.3 portions per day between 2002 and 2006 (Capacci & 
Mazzocchi, 2011).
The labelling of products in supermarkets as being healthy also has an impact 
on purchases – this can also be a good business move if demand is favourably 
infl uenced (see Box 1). A recent trial in the UK also concluded that numerical 
and visual information on the short-term benefi ts of quitting smoking can help 
increase the use of smoking-cessation interventions (Vogt & Marteau, 2012).
Further psychological initiatives include modifi cations to supermarket trolleys 
to designate a part of the trolley that the consumer might reserve for fruit and 
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vegetables, in response to a pilot project in New Mexico in the United States 
of America (USA) (see Box 1) that showed that this prompted consumers to 
double their purchases (if not necessarily their eating) of these items (Taylor, 
2010). Interestingly, behavioural psychology was also originally used in the 
1930s to persuade individuals to make use of shopping trolleys – with decoy 
customers with heavily loaded trolleys being visibly placed in shops.
Box 1: Two approaches to infl uencing food-purchasing patterns of supermarket 
customers
A team led by Collin Payne of New Mexico State University, USA, stretched some 
yellow tape across the middle of a shopping cart, with a sign telling shoppers to 
put fruit and vegetables in one half and their other groceries in the other. There 
was a 102% increase in sales of fruits and vegetables, without any decrease in 
supermarket profi tability (Taylor, 2010).
In the UK, a system of food labelling, with green products being the healthiest 
and red the least healthy, appears to have had some impact on consumer 
behaviour. Giving evidence to a Parliamentary Committee on behaviour change, 
the then chief executive of a major supermarket chain (Sainsbury’s), Justin King, 
stated that ‘... on the introduction of Multiple Traffi c Light labelling, against a 
comparable 12 week period during which fresh ready meal sales grew 26.2%, 
sales of Be Good To Yourself Easy Steam Salmon and Tarragon (mostly green 
traffi c lights) grew 46.1%, whereas sales of our Taste the Difference Moussaka 
(mostly reds) decreased by 24%’ (House of Lords Science and Technology 
Committee, 2011).
Legislation and regulation, if applied in conjunction with other interventions 
such as education and information campaigns, has been effective in infl uencing 
health behaviours in all settings (NICE, 2007), for example, through restrictions 
on access to some products, such as drugs and other substances.
In many countries, there are specifi c health and safety laws to reduce the 
chances of injury in settings such as the home, school and workplace. Another 
area where legislation plays an important role is in injury prevention, for 
instance through mandatory wearing of seat belts in cars, wearing of helmets 
by motorcyclists and restrictions on access to fi rearms. However, legislation 
is not always necessary for habitual change to promote safety on the roads – 
even without legislation, many countries have observed signifi cant increases in 
the use of helmets by bicyclists. Moreover, enforcement measures will often be 
needed to ensure that laws are complied with. There tends to be more public 
support for actions to protect children rather than adults, for example, in terms 
of banning smoking in cars when there are children present, as evidenced by 
legislation passed by the UK Parliament in 2014.
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5 What do we know about the effectiveness and cost 
effectiveness of these mechanisms?
Knowing what the key fi ndings are on traditional interventions and those 
relying on observations from behavioural economics and psychology may help 
in the design of interventions that infl uence people in positive ways in many 
different areas, including public health policy. This section highlights what 
is known about the effectiveness of these different measures to promote 
behaviour change in different contexts and settings. Where information 
on such measures is available, it also highlights what is known about their 
cost effectiveness.
It remains the case that the evidence base on effective strategies to change 
health-related behaviours is limited. Traditional approaches to behaviour change 
appear to have been most effective when the behaviour change in question has 
been relatively modest in nature, for example, the increased use of seat belts 
in cars (Mulgan, 2010). What is also clear is that, while behavioural economic 
insights are informing policy in some contexts, for example, in England, UK, 
there remains little information on the effectiveness of the approach, let alone 
its cost effectiveness.
5.1 Information and health education
The evidence on the impact of media campaigns is mixed and highly context 
specifi c. Generally, passive information and health-education programmes, 
while invoking cognitive and emotional responses and being necessary for 
behaviour change, may only have a relatively modest impact on behaviour 
change on their own. However, given that some mass media campaigns can be 
targeted at whole populations at relatively low cost per head of the population, 
even modest levels of change may be cost effective. They are more likely to 
have an impact when behaviour change is a time-limited event, for example, 
the need for vaccination. However, long-term change to habitual behaviour, 
such as is needed for a healthy diet or greater levels of physical activity, is 
diffi cult to realize, particularly given the pervasiveness of advertising and 
marketing of unhealthy products in society.
Mass media campaigns can also sometimes be hindered by poorly designed 
messages and lower exposure of the audience to the message, in an 
increasingly fragmented media environment. Individuals may have diffi culty 
in understanding risks or statistics in messages; the way in which information 
is packaged and the way in which relative risk is communicated is important.
Campaigns may also address health behaviours that audiences do not have 
the resources to change. Thus, they need to be combined with other strategies: 
a number of studies of campaigns focused on increasing consumption of fruit, 
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vegetables and low-fat milk have proved successful, especially when measures 
were taken to ensure that the target population was also able to access healthy 
foods (Wakefi eld, Loken & Hornik, 2010). These issues are context specifi c; in 
countries where healthy dietary patterns are more widely embedded in culture, 
such as Italy, mass media exposure on the virtues of the Mediterranean diet 
has been signifi cantly associated with greater adherence to this diet (Bonaccio 
et al., 2012).
A number of studies on evidence of the impact of media campaigns have 
focused on tobacco use. For instance, there is some evidence from a Cochrane 
review of 11 studies to suggest that mass media campaigns, including 
television and radio broadcasts, may have some impact on the smoking 
behaviours of adults, as part of comprehensive tobacco control programmes 
(Bala, Strzeszynski & Cahill, 2008). They are unlikely to be effective in individuals 
who are at high risk of daily exposure to smoking, without the use of other 
approaches, such as bans at work and in public bars (Gagne, 2007). The 
intensity and duration of mass media campaigns may also infl uence their 
effectiveness, but this is diffi cult to quantify. There is also weak evidence to 
support the use of mass media campaigns to prevent the uptake of smoking 
in young people (Brinn et al., 2010). Tobacco industry campaigns encouraging 
young people not to smoke could have the opposite effect if they conveyed 
the message that smoking as an activity for adults only was a ‘forbidden fruit’ 
(Wakefi eld, Loken & Hornik, 2010).
One review of the effectiveness of media campaigns on behaviours found little 
evidence of their effect on alcohol use, other than signifi cant impact on drink–
driving, where the law was enforced. It further found that individual motivation 
also infl uences the success of campaigns, as in the case of campaigns on 
physical activity (Wakefi eld, Loken & Hornik, 2010).
Mass media campaigns can potentially be a low-cost way of reaching a wide 
population, as in the case of infl uencing the consumption of skimmed milk 
(Wootan et al., 2005), but their cost effectiveness is often assessed within the 
context of other interventions. Targeted information campaigns can also play a 
cost-effective role; one example of this has been the use of information on road 
traffi c accident black spots in the Norwegian community of Harstad (see Box 2) 
(Ytterstad, 2003). The provision of low-cost information on support services at 
suicide black spots, such as bridges, has also been associated with a reduction 
in completed suicides.
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Box 2: Dissemination of information on traffi c injuries in Norway (Ytterstad, 2003)
Aims: pursued as part of a broader public-health goal to reduce road traffi c 
accident rates among children, the programme sought to increase awareness of 
the risk of traffi c accidents in children and families and to infl uence the adoption 
of safer behaviours.
Methods: reports containing information about traffi c injuries were distributed 
quarterly to all households in Harstad. The information focused on victim stories, 
medical statistics and data on the location of the accidents. Dissemination of 
the relevant information was targeted specifi cally to a local community, with 
‘personalized’ messages about the effects of traffi c injuries and precise locations.
Results: 56% of respondents reported having acquired information or good 
advice about traffi c safety from the reports. From the fi rst 2 years to the last 
2 years of the 10-year programme, there was a signifi cant (59%) reduction in 
traffi c injury rates among children in Harstad. Overall rates for all ages decreased 
by 37%. The intervention suggests that combining general educational material 
with tailored messages can bring about suffi cient awareness to effect a change 
in behaviour.
5.2 One-to-one counselling and peer-group support
There is some very limited evidence for peer-group support programmes for 
dietary behaviours and weight loss. In a review of commercial weight-loss 
programmes in the USA, one trial of a Weight Watchers programme was 
associated with a 3.2% decrease in weight after 2 years (Tsai & Wadden, 2005). 
More recently, a study in Australia modelled the potential cost effectiveness 
of two weight-loss programmes that included face-to-face group counselling 
sessions. Cost-effectiveness ratios were not favourable, at a cost of 130 000 
to 140 000 Australian dollars per disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted 
(Cobiac, Vos & Veerman, 2010). A major review on the use of lifestyle advisers 
and health trainers only provides limited support for their effectiveness; the 
programmes were not found to be cost effective in respect of physical activity 
and dietary behaviour change (Carr et al., 2011).
5.3 Routinizing of behaviours
There is some limited evidence emerging on the potential cost effectiveness of 
walking programmes that make use of pedometers to help routinize behaviour 
and ensure targets are met. One economic modelling study (Shaw et al., 
2011), drawing on data from the Walking for Wellbeing in the West (WWW) 
controlled trial in Glasgow, Scotland, UK (Fitzsimons et al., 2008), suggests 
that there is an economic case for scaling up this intervention more widely. This 
approach also highlights some of the issues that need to be taken into account 
in the evaluation of such programmes (see Box 3).
 Policy summary
16
Box 3: Assessing the economic case for scaling up a community pedometer walking 
programme in Scotland (Shaw et al., 2011)
An economic analysis of the Walking for Wellbeing in the West (WWW) study 
assessed the costs of the interventions (minimal and maximal) and combined 
these with effects to present incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (cost per 
person achieving the target of an additional 15 000 steps/week). A qualitative 
evaluation, involving focus group discussions with WWW participants and short 
interviews with members of the WWW research team, explored perceived 
benefi ts and barriers associated with walking, as well as the successful aspects 
and challenges associated with the interventions.
Incremental cost effectiveness was estimated as £92 and £591 per person 
achieving the target for the minimal and maximal interventions respectively. 
Qualitative evaluation gave insight into the process by which the results were 
achieved, and identifi ed several barriers and facilitators that would need to be 
addressed before implementing the interventions in the wider community, in 
order to ensure their effective transfer. These included assessing the impact of 
the relationship between researchers and participants on the results, and the 
motivational importance of monitoring and assessing performance.
It was concluded that pedometer-based walking interventions may be considered 
cost effective and suitable for implementation within the wider community. 
However, several research gaps remain, including the importance and impact of 
the researcher/participant relationship, the impact of assessment on motivation 
and effectiveness, and the longer-term impact on physical and mental health, 
resource utilization and quality of life.
5.4 Legislation and regulation
Legislation can be a highly effective tool, but it is unlikely to have much impact 
if imposed out of the blue, and may be viewed with resentment by the general 
public. It has been most successful when preceded by other actions to raise 
awareness of the health impacts of actions and to try and make modifi cations 
to the socioeconomic environment. Smoking provides an interesting example 
of this: as the evidence of harm has been accepted by the public, government 
intervention has grown from simple provision of information to, fi rst, the provision 
of a wide range of support to stop smoking (helped by the development of 
new medicines and other aids) and then, more recently, the introduction of 
bans on smoking in enclosed public spaces. Despite its intrusive nature, public 
support for these bans remains quite strong, in part because the public has 
been convinced of the harm to others as a result of passive smoking, in part 
because some smokers themselves felt that it would help them to quit, but 
also simply because many non-smokers fi nd the smoky atmosphere that used 
to prevail in pubs and some restaurants to be unpleasant. This suggests that 
building support for interventions at the more intrusive end of the spectrum 
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not only takes time, but may also depend on building coalitions of people with 
different perspectives.
There is good evidence suggesting that bans on smoking at work and in public 
places are effective (Shields, 2007; Callinan et al., 2010), although the form 
that they take and the level of enforcement can make a difference (Naiman, 
Glazier & Moineddin, 2011). Evidence from Austria and Finland indicates that 
partial bans in premises such as bars and restaurants that seek to separate 
smoking from non-smoking areas seem to have little impact; there also 
appears to be less imperative on the part of these organizations to prevent 
smoke leaking into smoke-free areas (Johnsson et al., 2006; Reichmann & 
Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2012).
Legislation may also be necessary to limit exposure of children to the advertising 
of unhealthy products. In some circumstances, industry self-regulation may be 
possible, but experience from Australia indicates that this had no impact on 
advertising of fast food to children (Hebden et al., 2011).
Another example of an intervention that lies at the intrusive end of the 
spectrum is Singapore’s approach to tackling childhood obesity. This involves 
compulsory exercise for overweight children, as well as careful monitoring of 
their diet – both of which involve some explicit segregation from others at 
school. While this has successfully reduced rates of obesity in children from 
14% to 9% (at a time when obesity has been rising in neighbouring countries), 
it has been argued that this has come at the price of stigmatizing overweight 
children (which may have been a prime infl uence in getting them to lose 
weight), and a growth in psychological problems, including eating disorders 
(Mulgan, 2010).
5.5 Fiscal measures and fi nancial incentives
There is a robust evidence base supporting the use of taxation to reduce 
consumption of harmful products such as alcohol and tobacco, and this issue 
is not focused on in this report. Taxes have been used much more infrequently 
to infl uence consumption of foods, so the evidence base here is more limited, 
although countries such as Hungary have recently introduced taxes on some 
unhealthy foods, where it remains to be seen what impact this will have. One 
tax on fat introduced in Denmark in October 2011 was abandoned 15 months 
later, after an effective campaign by industry for its repeal (Snowdon, 2013). 
The evidence that exists on the role of taxes for foods is complex – one review 
reported a wide variety of outcomes, with some statistically signifi cant fi ndings 
in the opposite direction to that expected (Hawkes, 2012). It is clear that when 
it comes to altering the price of food, the impact of price will sometimes be 
mediated by other factors that infl uence food choice, such as the cultural 
acceptance of alternative products (Hawkes, 2012).
 Policy summary
18
It should, though, be noted that the effectiveness of taxation can be dependent 
on enforcement of customs barriers and actions to prevent the development of 
a black market. Minimum pricing per unit of alcohol is now being considered 
in some jurisdictions; in the case of the island of Ireland, which includes the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (UK), an all-island approach to harmonize 
minimum pricing is planned, in order to avoid the potential for cross-border 
gaming of the taxation system. While taxes do have an impact, as in the case 
of smoking, not all population groups will change their behaviour in response 
to price signals alone. Other mechanisms to infl uence behaviours are required.
The evidence base on the use of fi nancial incentives to infl uence behaviour 
is weak. As well as being unpopular in some surveys of the public (who tend 
to argue that these incentives sometimes unfairly reward people for ‘bad’ 
behaviours) (Lynagh, Sanson-Fisher & Bonevski, 2013), most studies suggest 
that their impacts are short term in nature only, as for instance in the case of 
schemes to tackle obesity (Paul-Ebhohimhen & Avenell, 2008). This may be 
due to the way in which incentives are offered and the time period in which 
they are paid, as well as specifi c contextual factors ( Lynagh, Sanson-Fisher & 
Bonevski, 2011; Jeffery, 2012; Oliver & Brown, 2012). There is also, potentially, 
a risk of gaming associated with the use of fi nancial incentives – providing 
individuals with an incentive to take up poor health behaviours in order to qualify 
to enter schemes to earn rewards for giving up these behaviours. Financial 
incentives are more likely to be successful in situations where there are reliable, 
accurate and acceptable measures of behaviour change, and opportunities for 
gaming are minimized (Lynagh, Sanson-Fisher & Bonevski, 2013).
One review of 11 ‘quit and win’ contests for smokers in New York state, USA, 
where those who quit for at least a month were then entered into a prize draw, 
did observe signifi cantly higher rates of smoking cessation at 6-month follow-
up compared with non-incentivized attempts by smokers to quit. This approach 
was deemed to be cost effective (O’Connor et al., 2006).
One Cochrane review on smoking cessation was only able to identify one 
trial where incentives and competitions were shown to enhance long-term 
cessation rates (Cahill & Perera, 2011). No evidence on the cost effectiveness 
of any programmes was identifi ed. While 18 studies identifi ed did demonstrate 
initially promising outcomes, when fi nancial incentives and rewards were no 
longer being offered, cessation rates declined. One exception was a workplace 
smoking-cessation reward programme that sustained cessation success rates 
6 months beyond the time period of rewards. This scheme gave out substantial 
cash payments that totalled US$ 750 per quitter for abstinence over a 12-month 
period, rather than running its own smoking-cessation programme (Volpp et al., 
2009). However, this approach was possible because of the availability of local, 
independently funded smoking-cessation programmes.
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Moreover, subsequent analysis looking at the attitudes to fi nancial incentives 
in this study showed that most quitters (69.8%) in the incentive group were 
already motivated to quit, reported that they would have quit for less money, 
and said incentives were ‘not at all’ or only ‘somewhat’ important. Most non-
quitters in the incentive group reported that even US$ 1500 would not have 
motivated them to quit. The authors thus concluded that fi nancial incentives 
are ineffective at motivating some smokers to quit, stating that internal 
motivation and readiness to quit need to be suffi ciently high for relatively 
modest incentives to be effective (Kim et al., 2011).
There are, however, some circumstances where there is good evidence that 
even a short period of smoking cessation can help achieve a health-promoting 
objective, as in the case of smoking during pregnancy, where a review of six 
fi nancial incentive schemes indicates that smoking abstinence rates increase, 
with benefi ts for fetal growth, mean birth weight, percentage of low-birth-
weight deliveries, and duration of breastfeeding (Higgins et al., 2012).
Successful piloting of schemes using fi nancial incentives to help pregnant 
mothers to cease smoking can also be seen in the UK in Scotland (Dundee) and 
England (Birmingham). Mothers were paid £12.50 in the form of a credit on 
an electronic card, which could be spent on groceries at the local supermarket 
(excluding alcohol and cigarettes) – if they stopped smoking. In a positive 
assessment of the pilot, researchers found that an important reason why the 
incentive worked was ‘that using rewards gave mothers an excuse to opt out 
of the social norm of smoking within their peer group, but, crucially, did not 
isolate them from that group’.
5.6 Commitment contracts
There is weak evidence on the effectiveness of commitment contracts that do 
not make use of monetary incentives. A Cochrane review of 47 such schemes 
for health-promotion activities reported favourable outcomes in just 16 trials, 
with no long-term impacts on adherence. The review authors concluded that 
there was insuffi cient evidence from large, good-quality studies to routinely 
recommend contracts for improving adherence to treatment or preventive 
health regimens (Bosch-Capblanch et al., 2007).
Financial incentives have also been embedded into commitment contracts, for 
example, in trying to achieve weight loss, but, again, any gains achieved have 
been lost after the end of programmes. There is some evidence indicating 
that any positive changes in health behaviour gained as part of commitment 
contracts, such as risking the loss of a sum of money should health behaviour 
targets not be met, can be maintained for a longer time period if contracts are 
extended in length. This then begs the question as to how long contracts should 
be. One trial, taking account of individual propensity for loss aversion, made 
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use of deposit contracts in which the study participants put their own money 
at risk, which they would lose if they failed to achieve their weight targets 
(John et al., 2011). This programme demonstrated that greater levels of weight 
were lost than in a control group over a longer period of time (see Box 4).
Box 4: Evaluation: using commitment contracts to encourage extended weight loss 
(John et al., 2011)
Objective: previous efforts to use incentives for weight loss have resulted in 
substantial weight regain after 16 weeks (Volpp et al., 2008). The objective was 
to look at the effectiveness of a longer scheme (32 weeks versus 16 weeks) in 
a US population with body mass indexes between 30 and 40 kg/m2.
Design: participants had a weight loss goal of 1 pound (0.45 kg) per week 
for 24 weeks, followed by an 8-week maintenance period. A control group 
participated in either a weight-monitoring programme involving a consultation 
with a dietician, or monthly weigh-ins. There were two intervention groups; each 
received the same intervention as the control groups. Participants committed to 
deposit contracts where these funds would be lost if weight-loss targets were 
not met. In one deposit contract group, participants were told that the period 
after 24 weeks was for weight-loss maintenance; in the other, no such distinction 
was made.
Results: deposit contract groups lost signifi cantly more weight than control 
participants (8.7 pounds (3.9 kg) versus 1.17 pounds (0.53 kg) (P = 0.04). However, 
36 weeks after the 32-week intervention, the net weight loss between the 
incentive and control groups was no longer signifi cant, at 1.2 pounds (0.54 kg) 
versus 0.27 pounds (0.12 kg).
Conclusions: commitment contracts produced signifi cant weight loss over an 
8-month intervention; this was similar to that seen in a previous 4-month study; 
however, participants also regained weight post-intervention. Future experiments 
with commitment contracts should look at how long-term effi cacy might be 
achieved, for instance through varying the duration and levels of deposit 
amounts. The impact of non-incentive-based contracts should also be compared 
with that of deposit contracts.
There remains limited evidence on the effectiveness of other types of reward 
schemes. Hyperbolic discounting was used in the framing of a new partnership 
in the UK between the government and LazyTown, an Icelandic television and 
latterly multi-media programme (see Box 5).
 Policy mechanisms to infl uence health behavior
21
Box 5: Health-promoting children’s television programme and subsequent food 
product branding in Iceland (see http://www.lazytown.com/)
LazyTown was developed as a public–private initiative that has been operating 
nationally in Iceland since 1996, with the aim of making health education entertaining.
In Iceland, the scheme has led to a sustained reduction in the rates of 
childhood obesity.
In England, the Behavioural Insights Team and the Department of Health have 
formed a partnership with LazyTown, where a healthy superhero character, 
Sportacus, motivates children to eat healthily and be more active. The initiative 
requires young children to sign an ‘energy contract’ with their parents that 
rewards them for eating healthily (fruit is labelled ‘sports candy’), going to bed 
early and being active. The show also has the world’s laziest supervillain Robbie 
Rotten. LazyTown has an extensive web presence and applications can now be 
downloaded for mobile media devices, recognizing that children can be reached 
in many different ways. It is also on YouTube and Facebook.
Interestingly, the enjoyment that children gain with the LazyTown brand may 
also have other uses. Between 27% and 42% of preschool children in a trial in 
Iceland perceived LazyTown branded food to taste better than identical non-
branded food. These fi ndings indicate children’s preferences for child-oriented 
wrappings rather than regular wrapping (Gunnarsdottir & Thorsdottir, 2010). 
While this fact has long been used as a tool by the food industry to market 
unhealthy foods, the same approach could be used as one element of a strategy 
to promote healthy eating among young children. Such a scheme would almost 
certainly need the buy-in of food producers in order to be viable.
5.7 Combinations of strategies
Combinations of interventions are more successful than reliance on any 
one measure, but there have been relatively few attempts to estimate the 
effectiveness of combined actions compared to actions in isolation. Where 
such combined strategies have been evaluated, behavioural approaches have 
formed only a modest component of these efforts.
Modelling approaches developed as part of the World Health Organization’s 
CHOICE (Choosing Interventions that are Cost Effective) programme and 
then further adapted elsewhere have been used to look at population-wide 
actions in a number of areas, including prevention of chronic disease related 
to alcohol, tobacco or obesity. The cost effectiveness of different combinations 
of interventions to prevent alcohol abuse in 22 European countries has been 
examined (Chisholm et al., 2009). In the case of the UK, for example, the most 
costly combination of effective interventions: increased taxation, brief targeted 
advice, advertising restrictions, restrictions in access to alcohol and roadside 
breath tests, would still be highly cost effective. The programme would cost 
€350 million to implement or €6 per head of population, gaining more than 
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7400 healthy years of life every year per 1 million population, at an annual cost 
of €800 per healthy life-year gained.
Work in Australia on measures to prevent obesity, undertaken as part of 
the wide-ranging ACE (Assessing the Cost Effectiveness of prevention 
programmes), identifi ed a number of programmes with net savings to 
the health-care system over the life of the child, for example, education 
programmes to reduce television viewing, reduction of TV advertising of high-
fat and/or high-sugar foods and drinks to children, and family-based general 
practitioner (GP) programmes targeted at families of overweight or moderately 
obese children (Carter et al., 2009). However, while all of these interventions 
were deemed cost effective, the incremental cost effectiveness of different 
combinations of these interventions was not considered.
Other work linked to the ACE initiative modelled the potential cost 
effectiveness of different strategies to encourage the uptake of physical activity. 
This identifi ed a number of actions that could be cost effective in an Australian 
context – where a cost of 50 000 Australian dollars per DALY averted was the 
common metric used (see Box 6) (Cobiac, Vos & Barendregt, 2009).
Box 6: Modelling the cost effectiveness of interventions to promote physical 
activity in Australia (Cobiac, Vos & Barendregt, 2009)
From evidence of intervention effi cacy in the literature on physical activity, 
and evaluation of the health-sector costs of intervention and disease treatment, 
the cost impacts and health outcomes of six physical activity interventions were 
modelled over the lifetime of the Australian population. The cost effectiveness 
of each intervention against current practice for physical activity intervention 
in Australia, and the costs of implementation were determined.
Based on current evidence of intervention effectiveness, the intervention 
programmes that encourage use of pedometers, and mass media-based 
community campaigns, are the most cost-effective strategies to implement 
and are very likely to be cost saving. An internet-based intervention programme 
(3000 Australian dollars per DALY), a GP physical activity prescription programme 
(12 000 Australian dollars per DALY), and a programme to encourage more active 
transport (20 000 Australian dollars per DALY), although less likely to be cost 
saving, have a high probability of being under a threshold of 50 000 Australian 
dollars per DALY. GP referral to an exercise physiologist (79 000 Australian dollars 
per DALY) is the least cost-effective option, if time and travel costs for patients in 
screening and consulting an exercise physiologist are considered.
The authors concluded that, despite substantial variability in the quantity 
and quality of evidence on intervention effectiveness, and uncertainty about 
the long-term sustainability of behaviour changes, it is highly likely that, 
as a package, all six interventions could lead to substantial improvement in 
population health, at a cost saving to the health sector.
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Work at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has 
also looked at the most cost-effective ways to infl uence dietary behaviour as a 
way of preventing obesity. One model found that it was highly cost effective to 
combine the use of improved food labelling; self-regulation of food advertising; 
school-based intervention; mass media campaigns; and physician-dietician 
counselling in primary care. This had a cost per DALY gained of less than 
US$ 10 000 in different European and other high-income countries (Sassi, 2010).
6 How can the evidence base, including different modes 
of implementation, be strengthened?
Given the limitations in evidence and use of many actions to encourage 
behaviour change, from a behavioural economics and psychology perspective, 
this review now considers how the evidence base might be strengthened and 
highlights some issues that policy-makers and planners may wish to consider 
in respect of implementation.
One good starting point is to undertake a needs assessment in respect of 
potential target population groups. Multiple actions are likely to be required 
– some delivered to whole populations, others to specifi c population groups. 
A needs assessment, to identify actions of interest to target communities, can 
help facilitate change and, ultimately, uptake. Segmentation of initiatives so 
that they are tailored to specifi c groups can promote effectiveness. But this 
means it is important to understand what the principal barriers are in different 
population groups that need to be changed; this can also help in tailoring 
actions in order to improve uptake. Needs assessment and dialogue with local 
communities or target groups can help identify such barriers. For instance, cost 
or travel time to regularly take part in exercise activities at sporting facilities 
may be barriers; subsidies to take part in exercise, or the opening up of schools 
sport facilities to the local communities, may help to address these issues in 
some country contexts.
Individuals who are not highly motivated to make a behavioural change may 
need the opportunity to receive messages on the benefi ts of behaviour changes 
and perhaps also to have modifi cations made in their environments, in order to 
make change a more convenient choice. One study observed that individuals 
who were not well motivated and were from deprived communities would not 
make changes in lifestyles following provision of information to inform choice 
alone (Kellar et al., 2011).
The successful implementation of new mechanisms to infl uence behaviour 
change that can complement or augment existing mechanisms will also 
be dependent, in part, on public attitudes towards different potential 
interventions. Individuals may not wish to be ‘lectured to’ by governments 
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on some health issues, for example, on alcohol consumption. The public also 
may be unwilling to support some behavioural interventions that they perceive 
reward individuals for having bad habits, such as the use of fi nancial incentives 
to encourage smoking cessation. Early assessment of attitudes and needs can 
help identify such concerns.
Another study in the UK (Promberger, Dolan & Marteau, 2012) suggests 
that public willingness to support the use of fi nancial incentives to change 
behaviours very much depends on the type of fi nancial incentive and the health 
problem being targeted. There is more support for the use of vouchers to buy 
food, rather than luxury goods or cash rewards, when behaviour change is 
achieved. The study also found more support for the use of rewards to reduce 
weight rather than to help people to stop smoking. Public perceptions of the 
effectiveness of these interventions are also crucial; small improvements in 
overall effectiveness can result in greater increases in public approval for the 
use of these interventions.
6.1 Steps towards development of interventions for behaviour change
Guidance produced by NICE in England, UK, notes the importance of specifying 
three things with respect to any intervention that aims to change behaviour 
(NICE, 2007):
1. be as specifi c as possible about content;
2. spell out what is done, to whom, in what social and economic context 
and in what way;
3. make clear what underlying theories will help make explicit the key causal 
links between actions and outcomes.
The NICE guidance also emphasizes the importance of being clear about the 
behaviours that need to be changed, contextual changes that need to be 
made, and the level at which the intervention will be delivered (e.g. population 
wide, specifi c communities, specifi c individuals). It provides a set of questions 
as a checklist for planners (see Box 7).
Given that relatively little is known about the effectiveness of many behavioural 
interventions, it is important to build evaluation in to any implementation 
process, particularly given that actions may have more impact on some 
population groups than others and issues of equity need to be considered. 
There may also be other unintended positive or negative consequences of 
actions – for instance, do those who give up smoking start eating more, and, 
if so, how can this be countered? Evaluating how these actions work in practice 
may also help in tailoring them to meet the needs of different groups, for 
example, those from different cultural or social backgrounds.
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Box 7: Questions to consider when planning to implement an intervention for 
behaviour change (NICE, 2007)
• Whose health are you seeking to improve (target population(s))?
• What behaviour are you seeking to change (behavioural target)?
•  What contextual factors need to be taken into account (what are the barriers 
to and opportunities for change and what are the strengths/potential of the 
people you are working with)?
•  How will you know if you have succeeded in changing behaviour (what are 
your intended outcomes and outcome measures)?
•  Which social factors may directly affect the behaviour, and can they be 
tackled?
•  What assumptions have been made about the theoretical links between the 
intervention and outcome?
There will be specifi c factors that also need to be considered in the precise form 
that an action takes. For instance, take the example of commitment to change 
initiatives, where some form of deposit contract is used, and individuals deposit 
money, which they can only retrieve if they meet specifi c health-behaviour 
targets. This policy review has highlighted that these approaches can be 
successful in the short term in respect of smoking cessation and weight loss, 
but a number of issues that need to be considered and carefully evaluated in 
the design of these contracts have been put forward (Halpern, Asch & Volpp, 
2012) (see Box 8).
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Box 8: Example of issues to be considered in the design and implementation of 
a behaviour-change intervention: framing a commitment contract
Issues to be considered include the time period over which contracts operate. 
Experience suggests that behaviour change achieved with these contracts is not 
sustained in the long run.
The issue of what happens to money that is lost may also infl uence adherence to 
the terms of a contract – an individual may be less motivated to take action, for 
instance, if the money goes to charity, but may be more motivated if the money 
goes to other individuals who successfully complete the terms of their contracts.
The size of the deposit, and who determines this, may also infl uence uptake and 
compliance with contracts. Should there be matched deposits from the state or 
other stakeholder, and, if so, what should the balance be between deposits?
Can individuals who would be most likely to adhere to the terms of contracts be 
identifi ed? Potentially, this would increase the cost effectiveness of these approaches.
All of these issues could be examined and potentially tested in pilot phase before 
more widespread implementation.
Adapted from: Halpern, Asch & Volpp, 2012
6.2 Capacity-building for implementation
Health-system professionals, those working in other sectors, and volunteers 
involved in the delivery of behaviour-change interventions will all have specifi c 
needs for knowledge and skills that are necessary to support implementation. 
In England, UK, NICE has recommended training and support to improve ability 
to identify and assess evidence on behaviour change; understanding of the 
determinants of health, and on how to interpret data and design and evaluate 
actions; and the skills to work in partnership with other stakeholders and target 
population groups. It has also recommended reviewing current education and 
training practice, with disinvestment in approaches not supported by evidence 
(NICE, 2007).
What of the role that different stakeholders can play in implementation? 
Only a small number of actions for behaviour change can be delivered within 
the health-care system. It is important to coordinate actions across different 
government departments and across different tiers of government – national, 
regional and local. Engagement with the media, not-for-profi t sectors, 
employers and enterprise will be essential to effective actions. This includes 
identifi cation of positive benefi ts to these stakeholders of engaging in 
behaviour change, as for instance can be seen in the case of the Change4Life 
campaign in the UK (see Box 9).
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Box 9: The benefi ts of partnership working: the Change4Life campaign
In the UK, the Change4Life campaign involved over 200 partners drawn from the 
voluntary sector, businesses and local government. The campaign also involved 
over 50 000 local community groups. The Change4Life one year on report 
(Department of Health, 2010) noted that a number of health charities, including 
Cancer Research UK, Diabetes UK and the British Heart Foundation, ran their own 
campaigns in support of Change4Life. Businesses also supported the movement, 
for example by providing free gym access, discounted fruit and vegetables and 
low-cost bikes. Witnesses to a UK Parliamentary Inquiry on Behaviour Change 
(House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2011) reported that the 
campaign had used partnership working effectively. The chief executive of a 
major public relations company noted that the Change4Life campaign minimized 
confl ict, and the head of corporate affairs at Asda, one of the UK’s largest 
supermarket chains, said that the campaign worked because there was clarity 
around the role and responsibilities of all of the partners.
For instance, business has become much more green, as it has seen that 
there is market for green products; there is some scope for similar marketing 
opportunities in health promotion, as in the case of the willingness of the 
food industry to promote some healthier forms of food and drink that 
consumers demand, such as low-fat milk and low-fat margarine. Another 
example of this in a UK context is cooperation between business and 
government to promote the ‘fi ve a day’ consumption of fruit and vegetables, 
where businesses have viewed the ‘fi ve a day label’ as a way of making their 
products more attractive. More information is needed on how best to leverage 
the support of all stakeholders.
7 Conclusions and summary of key themes
Many different tools are available to policy-makers wishing to positively improve 
health through infl uencing health behaviours. Traditionally, public health policy 
has relied on a combination of tools, most frequently health-education and 
-information campaigns, taxation policies to infl uence decisions related to 
health behaviour, and legislation to prohibit unhealthy activities. However, while 
there have been many public health improvements, for example, reductions in 
the rate of smoking in most high-income countries, it is increasingly recognized 
that they are blunt instruments, which are effective but do not necessarily reach 
all of a target audience in all circumstances, or can be unpopular with a public 
that may see some measures as unnecessary encroachments of the state into 
matters of personal choice.
This policy review has indicated a growing body of knowledge on other 
mechanisms that directly seek to infl uence health behaviours, recognizing that 
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individual choice and decision-making is infl uenced by many different factors. 
They have evolved out of research focused on behavioural economics and 
psychology. These approaches should not be seen as a replacement for some 
of the conventional approaches to health-behaviour change; in many cases, 
they may be additional elements of a public health strategy to help reach 
different segments of a population. In some cases, they may also have the 
potential to be cost-effective alternatives to aspects of public health strategies.
Behavioural economics, in particular, seeks to explain why individuals may 
make decisions that do not conform to rational economic theories related, 
for instance, to risk and price. It can perhaps best be thought of as offering 
a library of tools, not all of which can be used at any specifi c time, but each 
of which may be of use in some particular contexts. It is not a universal 
panacea, but by using the insights from human psychology that are embedded 
in the approach, it may be possible to design interventions that – in some 
circumstances – are relatively well equipped to motivate people to behave in 
ways that are better for themselves, and for society at large.
For instance, if they are used to help people behave in ways that, after a period 
of refl ection, they genuinely want (e.g. to lose weight) or that they believe are 
genuinely good for society (e.g. to quit smoking), but people face bounds on 
their rationality, are directed by mental short cuts or heuristics that send them 
the wrong way, or fi nd their decisions to be particularly sticky around pre-set 
default options, then designing policy to account for these latter considerations 
appears legitimate and potentially benefi cial. For instance, default positions 
are unavoidable, so if people are often inert in their actions, it makes sense 
to choose the default that it is likely to generate the most individual and 
societal benefi t.
These approaches also suggest that there is scope to put more emphasis on 
the positive benefi ts of health and the level of enjoyment that can be achieved 
by changing behaviour (NICE, 2007; Behavioural Insights Team, 2010). 
Mechanisms that can reshape the environments in which people live can play 
an important role, helping to make it easier for individuals to make healthier 
choices, for example, on portion sizes, while still leaving them free to choose 
a less healthy amount of food.
In the current fi nancial climate, many potential policy proposals may also have 
the added advantage of being very low cost; for instance, altering a default 
rule, such as that required by prompted choice, requires imagination and a 
commitment to persuade sceptics that it is worth testing, but does not appear 
to require substantial additional fi nancial resources for its implementation. In 
other circumstances, costs may be borne by the nongovernmental sector, for 
example, minor redesign of supermarket trolleys to encourage the purchase of 
fruit or vegetables.
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It is also important to understand what mechanisms are acceptable to the 
public. Some might be deemed to be politically or ethically questionable 
(e.g. the general public might well object strongly to rewarding people for 
doing things that most people might think they ought to be doing anyway) 
(Reisinger et al., 2011). Members of the public may object to the principle of 
having fi nancial incentives or opt out for organ donation, preferring instead 
to rely on family consent (Rodrigue, Cornell & Howard, 2006). They may also 
object to penalties, for example, in respect of failing to meet weight-loss 
targets (Promberger et al., 2011).
Each proposal should be assessed on its own merits and it is important 
to emphasize that, under most behavioural economics and psychological 
proposals, people are not mandated to change their behaviour if they do not 
wish to do so. People can still choose not to eat healthy portions or to lose 
weight, they do not have to moderate drinking, and they can remain physically 
inactive. Behavioural interventions ought not, therefore, to be coercive in any 
strict sense of the word; rather, they should offer a gentle nudge to people 
to engage in behaviours that, on refl ection, they would prefer to do. This 
nudge, however, can be signifi cant when the environment in which individuals 
live is signifi cantly altered, for instance through the expansion of dedicated 
cycle paths.
Finally, it should be stressed that, while the science of behaviour change has 
been in development for some time, the actual application of theories and 
fi ndings to public health policy is still developing, with an increasing number 
of experiments and some mainstream policies now being put in place in parts 
of Europe, the USA and elsewhere. Thus, while a lot is known about long-
standing public health actions, such as the role of taxation, legislation and 
health-information campaigns, the evidence base on what works to infl uence 
behaviour, and in what context, is still in development, with many unanswered 
questions on how best to design new innovative interventions that can 
complement, and in some instances augment, well-established mechanisms. 
Despite there being plenty of policy ideas informed by behavioural economics 
fl oating around, more ideas are needed in a health context, and far more 
evidence is required on their likely effectiveness and cost effectiveness.
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